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FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVENUE ACT OF 1951
TAx avoidance through intra-family transfers of income is one of the most
troublesome problems under the Revenue Act. Given progressive tax rates,
substantial tax savings are possible if a single income, subject to a high rate,
can be split into several parts so that each is taxed at a lower rate. Family
heads have therefore used a variety of devices-assignments, trusts, partner-
ships and close corporations-in an effort to scatter income among family
members.' Because it is easy to create and manage, the family partnership has
been one of the most popular instruments for income deflection.2 Before 1948,
wives or children were usually chosen as partners, and credited with part of
the income of the husband's business.3 The 1948 Revenue Act permitted all
husbands and wives to split income whether a partnership existed or not.
1. For a summary of these devices and their development, see statement of the
Treasury Department in Hearings Before The House Committee on IWas and Means
on Revenue Revisions, 1947-48, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 866-74 (1947).
2. See tables and cases cited in Hearings Before House Conmittee on Ways and
Means on Revenue Revhions, 1947-48, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 945-6 (1947) for an indication
of the amount of litigation that arose even during the short period analyzed. From 1939
to the beginning of World War II, the number of family partnerships steadily increased.
During that time there were about 290,000 such partnerships in America. By 1943, there
were 930,000. For the year 1947 returns from partnerships indicated family participation
in 30 per cent of the cases. 97 Cong. Rec. 12427 (Sept. 26, 1951).
Another reason for the use of partnerships is that they have proved one of the most
difficult devices to regulate under the income tax laws. For purposes of computing net
income and amortization deductions, partnerships are recognized as economic entities.
INr. REv. CoD §§ 183, 190. But for other purposes the entity is disregarded and the
partners are treated individually. E.g.. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 181, 18. This inconsistent treat-
ment of the partnership has produced judicial confusion, and this confusion gave early
tax-induced family partnerships a good chance of achieving tax reduction. See Edward B.
Archbald, 27 B.T.A. 837 (1933), aff'd, 70 F.2d. 720 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. dened, Hel-
vering v. Archbald, 293 U.S. 594 (1934).
For a discussion of the problems which arise in taxing partnerships generally, see
Brookes, The Strange Nature of the Partnership Unider the Income Tax Law, 5 Tix
L. REv. 35 (1949), and Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Law,
55 HAv. L. REv. 909 (1942).
3. See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 230 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946). See also Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family--The Rev'n e
Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. Rav. 1097, 1111 (1948).
4. 62 STAT. 110 (1948), 26 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. 1951). The husband-wife split in-
come provision of 1943 was Congress' answer to the serious inequity which then existed
between married taxpayers in community property states and those in Common Law
states. Hearings Before House Committee on Ways and Means oil Reve,:ue Revisions,
1947-48, 0th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 70, 748-84 (1947). In Poe v. Seaborn, ' U.S. 101
(1930), the Supreme Court had held that the earnings of a married couple in a community
property state were taxable half to each, regardless of who actually earned them. In
Common Law states, however, the person who earned the income paid the tax and no
husband-wife split was allowed. The result was a series of protests in the Common Law
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Since then, taxpayers have sought further tax reduction by making their
children partners.5 Judicial attempts to distinguish transfers made solely for
tax purposes from those made to form valid partnership interests have resulted
in one of the longest and most vexing disputes in the history of the in-
come tax law.
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS BEFORE 1951
Family partnerships even if formed merely for tax avoidance were generous-
ly treated by the courts before 1930.' If the partnership was recognized under
local law, the court .was satisfied. The Supreme Court decision in Lucas v.
Earl,7 however, marked a change in judicial attitudes toward family transfers,
Earl had attempted to assign part of his income to his wife. In holding that
all the income must be taxed to the one who had earned it, Mr. Justice Holmes
started a trend toward judicial skepticism of all family transfers.8 Courts be-
gan to inspect more closely partnerships questioned by the Commissioner;
states and the utilization of intra-family transfers-among them the family partnership,
with the wife as a partner-in an attempt to achieve the tax savings enjoyed by the resi-
dents of community property states. Hearings Before House Committee on Ways and
Means, supra at 801, 805.
A second reason for the husband-wife split-income amendment was the confusion and
disputes that were arising from intra-family transfers. For a full discussion of the pro-
blems and the 1948 amendment, see Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24
TAXES 980 (1946), and Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Re'enae Act of
1948 61 HARv L. REv. 1097 (1948). For an explanation of the origin of the community
property system in America, see Hearings Before House Committee on Ways and Means,
supra, at 813-23.
5. See Burton, Family Partnerships and the Income Tax-The Culbertson Chapter,
98 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 143, 144 (1949).
6. Meeham v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611 (1892), set up three prerequisites for a valid
partnership: (1) joint endeavor for common benefit, (2) each party must contribute
either capital or services, (3) the parties must have a community of interests in the pro-
fits. Later decisions, however, tended to disregard the Meehain requisites. Elihu Clement
Wilson, 11 B.T.A. 963 (1928) (oral partnership agreement between three married couples
upheld, although wives contributed neither capital nor services) ; C. W. Crane, 19 B.T.A.
577 (1930) (partnership created with daughters by gift to them of father's partnership
interest upheld) and J. E. Briggs, 15 B.T.A. 1092 (1929) (taxpayer's partnership with
wife and sons upheld when neither wife nor sons contributed capital and where only one
of the two sons contributed services).
7. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
8. In disposing of the taxpayer's argument that he and the wife contracted to own
jointly the earnings of either one, Justice Holmes stated that "There is no doubt that
the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax could
not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned
it. That seems to us the import of the statute before us and we think that no distinction
can be taken... by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which
they grew." Id. at 114-5. For an analysis of the effect of Lucas on subsequent decisions,
see Surrey, Family Income and Federal Taxation, 24 TAXES 980 (1946).
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by 1940, courts were striking down partnerships tax-wise as consistently as
similar partnerships had been upheld before.0
In 1946, when the case of Tower v. Commnissioncr 10 reached the Supreme
Court, lower courts were seeking objective standards to judge the validity of
family partnerships. The Tower case involved a husband-wife partnership
where the wife performed no services and where her capital contribution had
originally been given her by the husband. The Court held the partnership
inoperative for tax purposes." Lower courts read the Tower opinion as re-
quiring either an original capital contribution by the wife or performance of
vital services for partnership validity.'2 But the search for criteria was not
over. In 1949 Cidbertson v. Commnissioner 13 held that the Tower case had
been misread: The partners' intent to form a genuine partnership was the
controlling criterion. Original capital contribution and vital services were im-
portant but not final considerations. After Culbertson, lower courts continued
to look primarily for capital contributions or services, but since a subjective
standard now determined the result in each case, decisions were unpredictable
and widely divergent.' 4
9. Compare L S. Cobb, 9 B.T.A. 547 (1927) with Blalock v. Allen, 56 F. Supp. 2 6
(D. Ga. 1944) and Mullard D. Olds, 15 B.T.A. 560 (1929), aff'd, 60 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1932) with R. NV. Camfield, 3 T.C.M. 123 (1944).
10. 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
11. In denying the existence of the partnership for tax purposes, the Court stated
that "a partnership is generally said to be created when persons join together their money,
goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a ... business and where there is a
community of interests in the profit or losses. When the existence of an alleged partner-
ship arrangement is challenged... the question arises whether the partners really and
truly intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in
the profits or losses, or both. And their intention.., is a question of fact, to be determined
from testimony disclosed by their agreement, considered as a whole, and by their con-
duct in execution of its provisions... "' Id. at 286-7. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S.
293 (1946) was decided the same day as the Tower case. The court there held invalid for
tax purposes a husband-wife partnership where the wife performed incidental services
but took no part in the management and where the alleged sale to her of a capital in-
terest in the partnership was held to be a sham.
12. Q. I. Roberts, 8 T.C.M. 60 (1949) (petitioner's wife held not a partner for in-
come tax purposes because she did not render sufficient services to the partnership).
Charles A. Carolin, 8 T.C.M. 548 (1949), aff'd. pcr curium, 181 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1950)
(wife assisted husband with clerical work on weekends and evenings; court found ser-
vices not "vital" and since wife merely helped out, she was not recognized as a partner).
Sol. M. Flock, 6 T.C.M. 945 (1947) (where wife contributed only gift capital from hus-
band and performed no services for the business, no partnership existed for tax purposes).
13. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
14. See Ardolina v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1951) rev'ersiny 8 T.C..[
1111 (1949) where appellate court did not regard as important the fact that the wife's
contribution to the partnership came to her as a gift from her husband. Compare also the
problems presented in Florence R. Miller, 8 T.C.M. 26 (1949), note 32 infra. See H. R.
REE. No. 569, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32-3 (1951). See also, Burton, Family Part:crships
and the Income Tax-The Cdbertson, Chapter, 98 U. or" PA. L REv. 143 1W) (19491
and Note, Income Taxation of Family Partnerships, 50 COL L Rrv. 68 (1950).
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THE 1951 AcT
To settle the problems raised by judicial administration of Cilbcrtson, and
with an eye toward reducing the interminable number of court disputes on
the subject, Congress in 1951 set its own standards for recognition and taxa-
tion of income of family partnerships. Congress' declared objective in the new
statute was to harmonize the rules governing interests in family partnerships
with those generally applicable to other forms of property or business: to
tax income from property to the real owner, and to tax income from services
to the person rendering the services. 1' Accordingly, Congress added the fol-
lowing sentence to the definition of "partnership" in Section 3797 of the
Internal Revenue Code:
"A person shall be recognized as a partner for income tax purposes if
he owns a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material
income-producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by
purchase or gift from any other person."10
Congress also added as Section 191 of the Code the following provision:
"In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the distributive
share of the donee under the partnership agreement shall be includible
in his gross income, except to the extent that such share is determined
without allowance of reasonable compensation for services rendered to
the partnership by the donor, and except to the extent that the portion
of such share attributable to donated capital is proportionately greater
than the share of the donor attributable to the donor's capital. The
distributive share of a partner in the earnings of the partnership shall
not be diminished because of absence due to military service. For the
purpose of this section, an interest purchased by one member of a family
from another shall be considered to be created by gift from the seller,
and the fair market value of the purchased interest shall be considered
to be donated capital. The 'family' of any individual shall include only
his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants, and any trust for the pri-
mary benefit of such persons.' 17
Thus, in the case of partnerships where income is in part produced by
capital, Congress wiped out Culbertson's intent criterion as well as the factual
15. Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on Revenue Act of 1951, H. R.
REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951) : "There is no reason for applying different
principles to partnership income. If an individual makes a bona fide gift of real estate,
or a share of corporate stock, the rent or dividend income is taxable to the donee. Your
committee's amendment makes it clear that, however the owner of a partnership interest
may have acquired such interest, the income is taxable to the owner, if he is the real
owner. If the ownership is real, it does not matter what motivated the transfer to him
or whether the business benefited from the entrance of a new partner."
16. Pub. Law No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 340(a) (Oct. 20, 1951).
17. Id. §340(b).
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standards of Tower. The amendment substitutes a blanket rule that all part-
nerships are good, no matter how created, if there was an actual transfer of
a capital interest.
To cope with attempted tax avoidance where one or more partnership in-
terests was obtained by gift or purchase from a family member, the amend-
ment provides for reallocation of income. If the partnership agreement dis-
tributes income without providing a reasonable allowance for services con-
tributed by the donor, or if the donee gets proportionately more for his capital
than the donor gets for his, the Commissioner may to that extent increase
the share of income credited to the donor.
Proposals for a legislative solution to the family partnership dispute had
previously been made in 1948 and 1950.18 The 1951 provision is a combination
of the earlier proposals. Usually the text of tax legislation is a synthesis of
many well advised views, worked over by four different Washington staffs."
But in the legislative haste to put over a family partnership amendment, little
attention was given to the text of the amendment itself, except by its ovM
particular group of sponsors.20 The result is a statute that will probably breed
litigation without solving the family partnership problem.
PRoBLEms OF DEFINITION
The first question raised by the new amendment is what type of partner-
ships and partners will now be recognized. Section 3797 states that in part-
nerships where capital is a "material income-producing factor" any person
owning a capital interest is a partner, no matter how the interest was acquired.
The major problems are (1) the effect of the section on personal service part-
nerships; and (2) whether trusts can be partners.
Personal Service Partnerships
It seems clear that 3797 covers any partnership with some invested capital.
Even where the amount of capital is small, it can, along with services, be one
of the recognized income-producing factors of the enterprise.21 But the a-
18. The 1948 suggestions were included with proposals for the husband-wife split
income provision. The adoption of the split income amendment was accepted as a partial
solution to the partnership problem since most family partnership litigation up to that
time involved husband-wife transfers. Hearings Before House Committee on Ways and
Meanzs, note 4 supra, at 801, 967. In 1950, Senate-sponsored action on family partnerships
was defeated by the House. 2 U.S. CoDE CoNG. SEmy. 3264 (1950). The 1950 Senate
proposal, however, vras substantially the basis for the 1951 amendment. Compare Sm..
REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 60-3 (1950) ith SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3841 (1951).
19. Communication to the YALE Law JOURNAL from Eugene Bogan, Sharp, O'Connor
& Bogan, Washington, D.C.; dated January 3, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library.
20. Ibid.
21. Whether capital is a material income-producing factor is a factual question to
be determined in each case by a consideration of the type of business, the total amount
of capital invested, the use made of capital, the relationship of income to services and
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mendment does not apply to a partnership where there is no capital or where
capital is an inconsequential income-producing factor.
Typically, personal service partnerships are formed by professional men,
each of whom contributes services alone to the business. Sometimes they join
together to hire younger specialists as assistants. Engineering, stock brokerage,
law or architectural firms are examples. Some family partnerships of this type
were recognized under Culbertson if each member contributed services and a
real business intent to form a partnership was proved. 22 Does 3797 mean that
a valid family partnership cannot be created by the contractual transfer of a
partnership interest, without the transfer of actual capital? Congress' failure
to mention personal service partnerships probably does not indicate an in-
tention to deny tax validity to arrangements which were valid under the old
law. These partnerships have been consistently recognized for tax purposes ;2
had Congress intended to change this settled law it would surely have done
so explicitly.
Assuming the continued recognition of personal service partnerships, can
an interest in such a partnership validly be created by gift? Clearly, courts will
refuse tax recognition to assignments of income from services. 24 But suppose
an engineer has an established personal service business, with a number of
similar factors. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.25-2 (1944), and Packel, The Next Inning
of Family Partnerships, 100 U. oF PA. L. REV. 153, 159 (1951).
In Greenberger v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1949), the Court of
Appeals, in reversing a Tax Court decision which had held that capital was not a material
income producing factor, stated that "the capital invested in the partnership was not large,
but the point is that (the partners) decided it was sufficient for the needs of the business
in connection with the available -income which the partnership had."
The problem arises also where for excess profits tax purposes, courts must decide
whether capital is a material income producing factor for a particular corporation. See
CCH ExcEss PRoFITs TAx REP. 1 55,066 (3d ed.) for the criteria used in this determina-
tion.
22. Larson v. Kraemer, 84 F. Supp. 313 (D. Conn. 1949) (valid personal service
partnership existed between husband and wife who worked together in building a school
business). See also Roy C. Fleeman v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. 770, 774 (1948) (husband-
wife personal service insurance business recognized as bona fide partnership for tax pur-
poses where both contributed "efforts, industry and skills.").
23. J. A. Mount v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. 1004, 1007-8 (1946) (wife who per-
formed valuable services in business largely of a personal service nature recognized as
a partner). See also Lawrence M. Hirsig, et al. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. 848, 851
(1945) and Peter F. Loftus v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. 974, 981' (1944).
24. Lucas v. Earl, supra notes 7, 8. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1932)
(purported transfer of half of husband's partnership interest to wife held inoperative and
income from this interest taxed to husband). The Leininger case, however, rested its
findings on the invalidity of the transfer of a partnership interest. There was no showing
that other partners had consented, and there was apparently no change in ownership of
partnership assets or controls.
The courts have generally accepted the view expressed in Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948) that "as long as the assignor actually earns the income or is
otherwise the source of the right to receive and enjoy the income, he remains taxable."
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employees. The business has profits which result from the combined labor of
its workers and from its reputation as a going concern,26 apart from the tax-
payer's salary. He might contend that he can make his son a partner and
that the son is entitled to "going concern profits" as an owner of a part of
the capital interest 26 in the partnership. True, there is only a negligible
amount of invested capital, but the taxpayer can maintain that a partner need
own no capital apart from ownership of a portion of the partnership interest.
And the son can dairn he has an interest in capital assets as they accumulate.2--
Section 3797, however, validates only gift partnerships where capital is a
material income-producing factor. But the taxpayer may argue that, in pass-
ing the new amendment, Congress indicated that its primary intent was to
recognize every valid gift of a partnership interest.
2 8
If this type of partnership were recognized, it should be subject to income
reallocation under 191, which applies to all partnerships created by gift. Thus,
income attributable to the going concern would be credited for tax purposes
in proportion to each partner's ownership of an interest in the business.
Trwst Partners
Prior to 3797, courts would not uphold attempts to split income by making
a trust a partner. The "intent" criterion of Culbcrtson was used to strike down
partner-trusts which contributed no services and whose capital contribution
resulted from a gift by the partner-grantor.2 0 But the word "person" in 3797
25. See Robinson, The Allocation Theory in Family Partnership Cases, 25 TAms
963, 970 (1947).
26. Cf. Commissioner v. Shapiro, 125 F.2d 532. 535 (6th Cir. 1942); "Respondent
sold all of his interest in the partnership, tangible and intangible, as a going concern,
which in all essentials is different from the ordinary assets of the partnership used in
the usual course of its business." The Commissioner has recognized a partnership interest
as a capital asset, and the gain or loss realized on the sale of such an interest as a capital
gain or loss. See G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 Cums. Bu.L. 58.
For an accounting treatment of the partnership basis after the interest of a partner
has been sold for more than his capital investment, see Spencer, Tax Consequences Arist:j
from Purchase of Partnership Interest: A Question of Basis. 91 J. Accou i cvr 111
(1951). The capital interest in a partnership is here recognized as an entity apart from
the underlying assets of the partnership.
27. MECmm, ELmsENTs oF PARTNER s , 16-17 (1920); LTrrT, Fan-ma. L-mcou
TAXATION OF PARranSHI's, 16-17 (1952).
28 H. R REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951) : "Your committee's amend-
ment makes it clear that, however the owner of a partnership interest may have acquired
such interest, the income is taxable to the ovner, if he is the Teal omer."
29. Kohl v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 95b
(1949) (gift in trust of interest in family partnership held inoperative for tax purposes
when it made no real change in the economic situation of the group or in the manage-
ment of the business) ; IV. B. Woolsey v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. 1038 (1946) (where
wife was trustee-partner of trust for children set up by gift from husband, husband taXed
on trust income since no family partnership recognized). Lily Ho Quon v. Commissioner,
6 T.C.M. 348 (1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1948) (trusts for children established
by husband and wife denied recognition as partners).
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includes trusts as well as natural persons.80 Hence under the new amendment
valid trusts set up by gift will now be recognized as partners because the trust
corpus constitutes the required invested capital in the partnership. This
recognition might appear to open a wide loophole for family tax scattering.
For example, a father with one son can make him a partner and give him
one-third of the partnership assets. Then the father can set up a trust with
the son as beneficiary, and make the trust a partner. Partnership income will
be split three rather than two ways, and less taxes will be paid.
There are, however, several crucial restrictions on this method. First, since
the Clifford 31 decision in 1940, the Commissioner can invalidate trusts for
tax purposes in a variety of situations where the grantor retains one or an-
other form of control over the trust corpus or income.8 2 Second, the trust
must be an accumulation trust with the income not currefitly distributable to
30. "The term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust,
estate, partnership, company or corporation." INT. Rsv. CODE § 3797(a) (1).
31. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
32. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21 (1947). Trusts invalidated where grantor
retained control: S. Kenneth Alexander v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 804 (1946) (trust
for wife where husband retained control over trust income held taxable to husband);
Henry F. Haldeman v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. 345 (1946) (trust income taxable to
trustee where husband and wife set up five family trusts, retaining control of each as
trustees). But cf. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1944) (father-
trustee of trust set up for children, through retaining broad controls, held not taxable on
trust income since trust was irrevocable and not for benefit of father). Revocable or short
term trusts invalidated: Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F.Zd 875 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Central
National Bank of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1944).
Valid trusts under the Clifford regulations have frequently failed as partners where
no business intent to form a partnership was proved. See: Florence R. Miller v. Com-
missioner, 8 T.C.M. 26 (1946). A husband-wife partnership was here held invalid under
the Tower case criteria of capital and services. Several trusts set up for three children,
with the parents as trustee-partners, were also invalidated. The years in question were
1940-1942. The parents' aim was to split income five ways, between the taxpayer, his wife
and the children's trusts, while the parents as trustees retained full control of the busi-
ness. On appeal from the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit held that under Culberison,
decided after the Tax Court opinion in the Miller case, the husband and wife had formd
a valid partnership. Three of the children's trusts which had been created by gift from
the taxpayer's father were upheld, and the case was remanded for a determination of the
validity of the partner-trusts created by gifts from the ta"payer. Florence R. Miller v.
Commissioner, 183 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1950) The Tax Court finally decided that the
broad control which the parents continued to exercise over the funds and management of
the partnership indicated "that in making the alleged transfers to themselves as trustees
for their minor children... (they) did not intend to form a real business partnership
with the children or with themselves as trustees for the children." Florence R. Miller, 2
P-H. 1951 TC Msix. DEc. 11424 (1951).
Basic policies for the treatment of family trusts for tax purposes were laid down in
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (income from revocable trust set up for wife;
grantor-husband retained extensive controls. Held taxable to husband) ; Burnet v. Wells,
289 U.S. 670 (1933) (income from one of five irrevocable trusts established by grantor-
father, which was used indirectly for benefit of grantor, held taxable to him) ; Fulham v.
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the beneficiary if the trustee is to pay the tax.m3 Once he has done so, the in-
come is not taxed again when later distributed to the beneficiary. Such an
arrangement means that the income credited to the trust is unavailable to the
beneficiary during the years it accumulates. But this income can be retained
in the business or otherwise invested for the beneficiary, and may be as valu-
able to him as if distributed.
Despite these limitations, under the new law it will often be highly advan-
tageous to establish a trust-partner. For a young child, several trusts might
be established, of different durations. 34 These would probably be taxed as a
single trust entity.35 But they would produce a single split in income now,
Commissioner, 110 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1940) (trust income taxable to grantor when grantor
retained, through parties not having a substantial adverse interest, practical control of
the trust corpus and power to revoke). In the leading trust case, Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331 (1940), the Supreme Court sustained the tax on the grantor, stating that
"where... the benefits [from the trust] directly or indirectly retained blend so imper-
ceptibly with the normal concepts of full overship, we cannot say that the triers of fact
committed reversible error when they found that the husband was the owner of the corpus
for the purposes of section 22(a) [of the Revenue Act]."
In 1945, the Treasury Department issued the Clifford Regulations in an effort to settle
the "considerable uncertainty and confusion!' that developed from judicial application of
the Clifford doctrine. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.22(a)-21 (1947). Generally the Clifford
Regulations stated the Treasury view that the income would be taxable to the grantor
if (1) the trust or trust income would return to the grantor within a short term of years,
(2) if the grantor retained substantial control over the trust corpus or trust income, or
(3) if the trust or trust income were subject to administrative control e.xercised for the
benefit of the grantor. Ibid. See also 6 MERTNs, L xw oF FEDE AL Iucouin TAXATIo
§ 37.17 et. seq. for a detailed treatment of the Clifford doctrine.
33. Plimpton v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1943): "[T]he statute
taxes income which is to be distributed currently, whether actually distributed or not,
to the beneficiaries, but taxes income to the fiduciary which may in his discretion be either
distributed or accumulated, excepting only such part thereof as may have been actually
distributed in any year, which part it taxes to the beneficiary. The scheme of the statute
... is not to tax income to a beneficiary which he is not entitled to receive...."
Nor can the income be distributed at the discretion of the beneficiary if he is to avoid
paying the tax Bunting v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1947) affnning 5 T.C.M.
704 (1946) (one of three beneficiaries held taxable on all of the trust income where the
instrument gave the beneficiary the power to amend the trust "in any respect vhatso-
ever," including the right to name himself sole beneficiary and withdraw all or any of
the corpus. But cf. Allen v. Nunnally, 180 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1950) where a grantor
created a trust for his grandchildren, naming a corporate trustee, but giving his son the
power to revoke, alter or amend the trust in any way, including a change of trustee or
beneficiary. On the ground that the son held this power in a fiduciary capacity, which
would forbid naming himself as beneficiary, the son was held not taxable on the trust
income.
34. Trusts of different durations would be advantageous in that they would release,
at different expiration dates, income to the beneficiaries.
35. Spies v. United States, 180 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1950) affirming 84 F. Supp. 769
(N.D. Iowa 1949).(Where three children who were trustees and equal beneficiaries had
power to distribute the trust income to themselves or accumulate it, they were held taxable
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reduce present taxes, and provide a fund of tax-free income for planned in-
tervals in the future. To set up the same savings plan under Ciebertson, the
grantor would first have to pay a tax on the total income. Under the new
legislation, savings can be accumulated and a tax advantage gained at the
same time.
REASONABLE COMPENSATION AND PROPORTIONAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
Section 191 now guarantees recognition of family transfers which might
have failed under the intent test of Culbertson. But it also authorizes the
Commissioner to reallocate income for tax purposes where such reallocation
was not previously allowed once a valid partnership was proved.3 0 Congress
apparently intended that for family partnerships created by gift, the income
would be taxed as if a reasonable allowance for services had been made to
the partners, and as if the balance of profits had been allocated according to
the amount of capital the partners had invested.3 7 The wording of the statute,
however, is vague enough to afford both Commissioner and taxpayer oppor-
tunity to argue for other allocations which will be more to their advantage.
Commissioner's Argument
The Commissioner will begin his efforts by attempting to set the value of
the donor's services as high as possible. This will require him to adopt an
opposite line of attack from that used in many closely held corporation cases.
on the undistributed income- Although no one beneficiary had "unfettered command" of
the income, the court considered all three in effect "a single trust entity."). But C/. Allen
v. Nunnally, 180 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1950), supra note 33.
36. INT. REV. CoDE § 191. This statutorily granted power to reallocate income is not
the first time reallocation has been permitted. In Woolsey v. Commissioner, 168 F.Zd 330
(6th Cir. 1948) and Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948), the court,
in recognizing two husband-wife partnerships, denied income reallocation contrary to the
partnership agreement. Both opinions, however, apparently recognized the power of the
Tax Court to reallocate income in cases where a valid partnership was found but the in-
come distribution was inequitable. Hartz v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 313, 318 (8th Cir.
1948) held that since a valid partnership existed, "[t]he Tax Court had no right to
reapportion the income of the partnership between the partners for tax purposes." Tile
Hartz decision did not answer the problem whether in some cases, partnership income
might be reallocated by the Commissioner. The Culbertson case avoided the reallocation
problem: "No question as to the allocation of income between capital and services is
presented in this case, and we intimate no opinion on that subject." Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 748 (1949). Despite this implicit recognition of the Tax Courts'
power to reallocate income in cases where recognized partnerships disproportionately dis-
tribute it, no court since the Hartz decision has allowed reallocation. For a discussion
of the few decisions where the issue was raised, see 2 P-H 1951 Fm. TAx SagV. 15,522.
The Treasury, however, has consistently argued that it should be allowed to reallocate
income in proportion to capital invested and services rendered. I.T. 3845, 1947-1 Cutm.
BuL.T 66, 68.
37. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951).
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Recognizing the possibility that income of closely held corporations may be
reduced or exhausted by salaries of officer-stockholders, the Commissioner
has frequently attempted to decrease such allowances in order to tax more
profits. 3 Although the Commissioner's arguments may thus appear incon-
sistent, his position is not unreasonable in view of the fact that both family
corporations and family partnerships may be tax avoidance devices. Neverthe-
less he must find a convincing theory for treating differently functionally
equivalent compensation.
Since Section 191 does not define "reasonable compensation," the Tax Court
will probably look for interpretative assistance to decisions under the "reason-
able allowance" clause of Section 23(a) (1) of the Revenue Code, the section
applicable to corporate officers' salaries. 39 Courts determine a reasonable
allowance under Section 23 by an ad hoc consideration of all the facts in each
case, the most acceptable proof being a comparison with salaries for like posi-
tions in firms of similar size in the same industry.40 In order to treat partner-
ship and corporate salaries differently, the Commissioner will probably argue
that "reasonable compensation" under 191 cannot be determined by the criteria
used in finding a "reasonable allowance for salaries" under 23(a) (1 ). The
difference in language, so the argument runs, shows that Congress did not
intend to make the two standards equivalent. On the contrary, the Commis-
sioner will maintain that while the standard of 23(a) (1) is the value services
would have on the open market, "reasonable compensation" in a partnership
38. Note, The Deduwtion of a Reasonable Allowance for Salaries-The Undefined
Power of tw Commissioner, 56 HARV. L. REx. 997 (1943). See also Note, Mae Light on
a Reasonable Alo-wance for Salaries, 59 Htv. L. REY. 286 (1945) and Volder, Facts
and Figures on Reasonable Compensation, 24 TAxES 150 (1946).
Salaries are deductible for tax purposes only if they are "reasonable!' within the mean-
ing of § 23 (a) (1) (A). See note 39 infra. The Commissioner therefore frequently attempts
to disallow the deduction by proving that the salary paid is unreasonable. Thus, in Long
Island Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. dc:icd, 311 U.S.
680 (1940) a family corporation paid its officers both a fixed sum and a percentage of
profits as salary. The court allowed the taxpayer-officers to deduct only the fixed sum
as a business expense.
39. Section 23 states that: "In computing net income there shall be allowed as de-
ductions... [a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business, including a rcasonable allowance for sala-
ries.... " INT. Rzv. CODE § 23(a) (1) (A) (emphasis added).
40. Faucette Co., Inc., 17 T.C. 187, 196 (1951) ("evidence of salaries paid for similar
services by comparative businesses... is recognized as one of the most satisfactory tests
[of reasonableness]").
These factors may include: an employee's qualifications, the extent and scupe of his
work, prevailing rates of compensation, the size of the business, the ratio of salaries to
gross income, general economic conditions, salaries paid in previous years, expert opinion
testimony and in some cases a comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders.
For a full explanation of these criteria, see 4 .MnrTExs, LAw or FEor.nz I:couE TAX,%-
Tiox §§ 25.51, 25.62 (1942).
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includes an additional amount in recognition of the firm's profits as a going
concern.
41
If the Commissioner is successful, however, the court must seek a formula
for determining the reasonable value of the donor's services. The Commis-
sioner will probably want to allocate the entire partnership income to capital
and services. Such a formula has been used to meet the needs of community
property cases where the reasonable value of the husband's services had to be
computed to separate community income from income earned by separately
invested capital.42 This formula, embodied in G.C.M. 9825, offers an approved
method for determining the donor's value to a partnership, measured by a
percentage of partnership profits. 43 Assume a partnership earns $100,000 an-
nually. Assume further that under the criteria of Section 23 $36,000 would
41. The Committee Reports for the 1951 Bill speak only of "reasonable compensation
for services" and a "reasonable allowance for services" without further defining Con-
gressional intent. SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1951) ; H. R. REP. No. 586,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951). But the Senate Finance Committee Report for 1950, from
which the later reports were drafted, states that the proportionate value of the services
of family members of a partnership must be allocated for tax purposes. SEN. REP. No.
2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1950). The Commissioner may maintain with some justifi-
cation that the 1950 wording expressed Congress' intent that the value of the donor's
services measured by the profits of the going concern be allocated to him, and that the
1951 reports indicate no change in Congressional intent.
Section 222 of the Senate's proposed 1950 law used the term "reasonable proportionate
allowance" to describe the amount to be allocated to the donor's services. It is also
evident that in 1951 the Senate Finance Committee at least was aware that confusion
might result if the statute did not clearly state whether a "reasonable salary" or "the
reasonable proportionate value of services" was intended for allocation purposes. See
Hearings, Senate Committee on Finafce on Revenue Act of 1951, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
1830 (1951). The lack of a distinction in the 1951 law and its Congressional reports,
coupled with the notice of possible confusion and the colorable intention expressed in the
1950 bill and reports makes the Commissioner's argument at least plausible, if not com-
pelling.
42. In community property states, income earned by the services of the husband was
considered community income and taxed half to the husband and half to the wife. Income
from separately invested capital-for example, capital invested either by husband or wife
before marriage-was not considered community income and was taxed entirely to the
owner of the investment. If the husband was a member of a partnership before marriage
and continued as a member after marriage, his income from services after marriage
would be community income; his income from invested capital would be his individual
income. G.C.M. 1030, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 26 (1927) established the general Treasury policy
for taxing this latter income separately. G.C.M. 9825, X-2 Cum. BULL. 146, 149 (1931)
outlined in further detail the method for doing so.
43. G.C.M. 9825, X-2 Cum. BULL. 146 (1931) (hereinafter cited as G.C.M. 9825).
G.C.M. 9825 was approved and applied in Clara B. Parker, 31 B.T.A. 644, 658 (1934)
(income apportioned between earnings of services and earnings of capital in accordance
with G.C.M. 9825). See also Todd v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 399 (1946) (Commissioner's
determination of value of father-partner's services under G.C.M. 9825 upheld).
As late as 1947, the Treasury stated that if the courts would allow allocation of
partnership income, it would use the method indicated in G.C.M. 9825 for reapportion-
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be a reasonable salary for the donor, and that $24,000 would be a fair return
on invested capital.44 Under G.C.M. 9825, the Commissioner would then al-
locate 24/60 of $100,000 or $40,000 to capital, and 36/60 of $100,000 or
$60,000 to services. 45 If donor and donee had equal amounts of invested capi-
tal, the donee would then be taxed on half the income allocated to capital-
$20,000, and the donor would pay taxes on the remaining $80,000. Thus
G.C.M. 9825 apportions business profits percentage-wise, part to services
and part to invested capital. Under this theory, Congress' new restrictions
are adequate to prevent any deflection of income from the true owner.
If the courts accept this formula, does it mean that income must be appor-
tioned according to profits each year, or can an average annual profit be used
as the basis for a long term allocation? If the partnership agreement provides
for a fixed return to the donor based on such an average anuual profit, it
would seem reasonable for the Commissioner to accept for several years at
least a single determination under G.C.M. 9825.
Taxpayer's Argument
The taxpayer, on the other hand, can maintain that there is no ground for
interpreting "reasonable compensation" in Section 191 to mean anything dif-
ferent from a "reasonable allowance for salaries" under Section 23. Despite
the verbal difference, nothing in the Committee reports or legislative history
shows that Congress intended a distinction. 40 And compensation to the part-
ner-donor is functionally the same as salary to a corporate officer. In both
partnerships and close corporations, the donor-father is typically the chief
income earning figure in the enterprise.
The taxpayer may advance his own allocation proposal by arguing, con-
trary to the theory of G.C.M. 9825, that profits cannot be allocated rationally
between capital and services because some profits are not attributable percent-
ment. LT. 3845, 1947-1 Cum. Buz.. 66, 68. But the weight of authority before the 1951
amendment was against any income reallocation once a partnership wvas recognized. See
note 36, supra. See also 2 P-H 1951 FED. TAx SEav. It 15,522 G.C.M. 25642. 1943-1 CY-.7.
BuLu. 60 modified a part of G.C.M. 9825 but did not change its general treatment of part-
nership income. Cf. Estate of S. U. Tilton et al. 8 B.T.A. 914, 917 (1927) ( If the part-
ners agree on a proportion distribution of partnership profits, the agreement will be
given effect since the courts have recognized the impracticability of determining the
relative values of the respective contributions of the individual partners:').
44. A fair return on invested capital may be measured by the reasonable rate of in-
terest on a long term investment, well-secured. Lawrence Oliver v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
684 (1945).
45. The example is taken from G.C.M. 9-825.
46. But see note 41, sufpra. The taxpayer may argue that the difference in language
between "reasonable compensation" and "reasonable salary" is insignificant and that if
Congress had intended a distinction, it would have been clearly stated in the statute.
Furthermore, the 1951 Committee reports talk in terms of a "reasonable allowance" and
"reasonable compensation" and say nothing about the vaalue of a donor to a partnership.
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age-wise to either.47 Thus, in the previous example, the value of capital
($24,000) and services ($36,000) together totalled only $60,000 out of a
$100,000 income. From where does the extra $40,000 come? According to
the taxpayer's theory of profits, it comes from the partnership as an operating
economic enterprise, from the risk of continuous operation and from the repu-
tation and good will accumulated over the period of doing business. 48 This
profit remains after reasonable compensation for services has been made to
the partners and after the earnings of invested capital have been proportion-
ately distributed to each contributor of capital. The new law, taxpayers will
point out, requires proportional distribution only for the share attributable
to capital. It says nothing about the distribution of the profit increment from
the going concern. Hence the taxpayer will maintain that the $40,000 can be
allocated any way the partnership agreement provides. The result of his pro-
posal could be that the donee is taxed on the $40,000 plus the income from
his capital, a total of $52,000, while the donor pays taxes only on the remain-
ing $48,000. Thus the new law can be read to permit tax avoidance where
the donee has provided no services and the profit increment of the operating
business results from the past energy and resourcefulness of the donor.
Congressional Intent
In passing Section 191, Congress probably intended that after a reason-
able salary had been credited for the services of the donor, the balance of the
income would be distributed according to capital holdings.40 Thus, using the
same example, the donor would be taxed on income from his services plus
half the remainder, and the donee would be taxed on the other half. The
donee's share would be $32,000; the donor's $68,000. Where equal father-son
partners establish and build a business, such an allocation of capital earnings
is equitable.50  But in many family partnership cases this distribution would
defeat Congress' primary purpose to tax income to the one who earns it.
Suppose a father who has built up a business over many years forms a part-
nership, giving his son a half interestr1 Profits, apart from the father's salary,
may then be distributed under 191, half to the father, half to the son. But this
distribution is equitable only for one year. In the partnership's second year
the father will have contributed both his capital and services to maintain the
going concern; typically, the son will have contributed only his invested capital.
47. For an explanation of the economic theory of profits and the fallacy of apportion-
ing them on a percentage basis between income attributable to capital and income attri-
butable to services, see Robinson, The Allocation Theory In Family Parhtership Cases,
25 TAXES 963, 970 (1947).
48. Id. at 970.
49. H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951).
50. In this situation, each partner has performed equal services and each has invested
an equal amount of capital. Therefore, each partner has an equal "interest" in the busi-
ness, and profits, after compensation for services has been paid, can be equitably split.
51. See note 26 supra.
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Hence a larger portion of the "going concern profits" is now attributable to the
father, and profits can no longer properly be distributed half to the father and
half to the son.52
Congress might have found a better solution to the allocation problem if
it had recognized that in most family partnerships created by gift the donee is
in fact like a limited partner.53 He contributes no managerial services and is
probably expected to bear no liability beyond the gift he invests.51 For tax
purposes, therefore, the donee's income should be limited to a fair return on
invested capital. This return might be measured by the income generally re-
ceived on capital invested in similar industries.5 The remaining partnership
income would then be credited to the donor.
Under 191, however, a fixed return to the donee on invested capital might
not always be allowed. Thus, in high profit years, a 7% return on invested
capital might comply with the statute. But in low profit years, a 7,% return
to the donee might not leave enough profit to satisfy 191 requirements for
reasonable compensation to the donor and at least an equal 7%1 return on the
donor's capital. The partnership agreement could provide, however, for a
special distribution to comply with 191 in low profit years.
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ALLOCATION PROVISIONS
Non-partner Donors
.Many family partnerships may avoid the allocation restrictions of the new
statute without fighting any of the major battles predicted above. Congress
52. Nor can the increased (or decreased) profits from the business, under this theory,
be credited each year to the father, since they derive from the continued existence of the
going concern, and are not computably related to the father's services. In each successive
year, as the father contributes both services and capital to the business, and the son con-
tributes capital alone, the son's proportional interest in the partnership decreases as it
approaches the point where it derives solely from the value of his capital investment.
53. The son is not technically a limited partner unless there is compliance with the
requirements of the relevant state statute. BALLANTINE, CoRrORArNos §3 (1946).
In a regular limited partnership, arms-length business dealing ensures that the limited
partner gets a fair return on his investment under the partnership agreement and no
more. Limited partners, therefore, are generally treated for tax purposes as ordinary
partners. 6 MERTE-Ns, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 35.07 (1949). Arms length
arrangements, however, do not e~xst in tax-induced family partnerships and donor-part-
ners are likely to credit their sons with more than the son's legitimate share of income.
54. The son in a typical family partrqership case takes an insignificant, if any, part
the management of the business. Furthermore, he usually has no capital to risk beyond
the amount given to him for reinvestment in the business. Some courts have questioned
whether the legal incapacity of a minor child prevents him from becoming a partner. See
Daniel J. Fry, 4 T.C. 1045 (1945).
55. See e.g., Lawrence Oliver v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 6S4 (1945). There business
income was attributable, in a community property state, half to services and half to
capital. The Tax Court held that the portion to be attributed to capital should amount
at least to the usual interest on a long term, well secured investment, in this case, a 7%
return.
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intended that reasonable compensation for services be credited to partners.60
The statute, however, requires that allowance be made only for services
rendered by the donor, and that the allocation to the donated capital must not
be proportionately greater than that attributable to the donor's capital.57 So
drafted, the statute may allow many partnerships to avoid completely the new
allocation provisions. Existing husband-wife partnerships have the best chance.
Before the split-income provision of the 1948 Revenue Act, numerous hus-
band-wife partnerships were formed to split income previously taxed to the
husband.5 8 After 1948, there was no tax incentive for new husband-wife part-
nerships. But neither was there any reason to change existing partnerships,
Undoubtedly many are left. Under the 1951 law, the partner-wife can now
give her share to her children, and they will be recognized as partners. Since
the husband is not the donor, and the donor-wife is no longer a partner, the
new law imposes no restrictions on income distribution to donees. The hus-
band and wife can already split their income; when a child is substituted
for the wife as a partner, the family makes further tax savings since it then
can split income three ways. The Commissioner will doubtless ask courts to
look back through the original husband-wife partnership and treat the husband
as the donor. But even if the inquiry is carried this far, in cases where the
wife originally invested her own capital the husband was never a donor and
no restrictions on the income allocation under the new amendment would be
applicable.
Change from Family Corporation to Partnership
Before 1951, family corporations were often formed because of the difficulty
of obtaining tax recognition for partnerships."0 In many cases, the Commis-
sioner succeeded in fixing officer's salaries at a low figure, and taxing the
balance of the income as corporate profits. 0 Under the new law, many of
these corporations may achieve tax savings by transforming into partnerships.
The court may decline to look back far enough through the corporate period
to find a donor; in these cases, the family partnership will not be subject to
any allocation restrictions under the new act. Even if the enterprise is con-
sidered a gift partnership, the low salary previously determined by the Com-
missioner may be controlling for the partnership. An important additional
incentive for making such a change is the opportunity to avoid high corporate
taxes and the recently renewed excess profits tax.61
56. H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951).
57. INT. REv. CoDE § 191.
58. See note 4 supra.
59. See Alexandre, The Corporate Counterpart of The Family Partnership, 2 TAX
L. REv. 493 (1947) and Mannheimer, Income Tax Status of Gifts of Family Corporationl
Stock, 25 TAXES 604 (1947).
60. See note 38 supra.
61. See INT. REv. CoDE- §§ 13,15,430-72. The excess profits tax was renewed in 1950.
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De Facto Partnerships
The new law gives the Commissioner an additional weapon when a -alid
gift is proved. Before 191, where following an intra-family transfer no formal
partnership was attempted, the Commissioner could only argue that the gift
itself was invalid.6 2 Now, it is to his advantage to argue that a de facto part-
nership exists. Two recent cases 63 reveal attempts to avoid partnership tax
problems by madng a gift of income-producing property to a family member
without any attempt to form a partnership. In one,04 a sheeprancher gave each
of his children part of his flock. The father continued to manage the flock and
the income was distributed between the father and children. There was a sepa-
rate bank account and separate legal title but otherwise things were the same
as if the gift had not been made. The court upheld the gift and the split in
income, stating that since no partnership existed, the decision must rest on
whether there was a valid gift.65 Since the case arose before the 1951 amend-
ment, the Commissioner of course did not argue the existence of a dc facto
partnership, because at that time no allocation would have been permitted.CP
But under the new law, even if such a gift is held valid, the de facto partner-
ship argument may allow the Commissioner to reallocate income under 191.
RETROACTIVE EFFECTS OF THE NEW AmENDMENT
Congress limited applicability of the new statute to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1950, and stated specifically that no inferences were to be
drawn from the statute with respect to taxable years before 1951. G7 Since
partnership cases in the courts during the next several years will involve
taxable periods before 1951,68 the date limitation of the new statute means
62. Early v. Atldnson, 175 F2d 118 (4th Cir. 1949); Henson v. Commissioner, 174
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1949); Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F2d 204 (5th Cr. 1944).
63. Alexander v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Visintainer -,. Com-
missioner, 187 F2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 342 U.S. 858 (1951).
64. Visintainer v. Commissioner, supra, note 63.
65. "This transaction was not in the form or color of a family partnership or of an
assignment of undivided interests in the sheep. It was in the form of gifts to the children.
The taxpayer urges that it constituted gifts, and it must stand or fall as bona fide gifts
rather than a family partnership or assignments of undivided interests in property." Id.
at 522.
66. See note 36 mpra.
67. H. R REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1951). Pub. Law No. 183, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 340(c) (Oct. 20, 1951). The dispute over retroactivity was the only
contested issue between House and Senate on the family partnership amendment. The
Senate, following its 1950 proposal, wanted to make the legislation retroactive for tax-
able years back to 1938. SEN. Rm. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1950) ; SMI. RE.
No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-1 (1951).
68. The time-consuming process of auditing tax returns, charging deficiency assess-
ments and, when disputes arise, appealing them to the Tax Court means that cases in-
volving 1951 and later tax years will not be decided for several years. See 6 Mmnms,
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that hundreds of cases will continue to be governed by the uncertain Culbert-
son test. Congress' determination to uphold all family partnerships if there
is a valid gift of a capital interest might provide a standard for future judicial
decisions even on pre-1951 cases. But the use of this standard, absent the
statutory authority to reallocate partnership income, would simply be a bo-
nanza for taxpayers. The Courts of Appeals have heretofore overruled any
attempts of the Tax Court to alter income distribution under valid partner-
ship agreements.69 If they now recognize partnerships that would have failed
before, but refuse to reallocate income for years before 1951, many taxpayers
will gain all the benefits of the new legislation without any of its restrictions.7 0
The Senate Finance Committee felt that judicial confusion would be better
resolved if the amendment could be applied to any open taxable years since
December 31, 1938 at the option of members of a partnership in a tax dis-
pute.71 Congress, however, rejected the Senate Committee's proposal, perhaps
feeling it inequitable to admit some cases under the new statute where many
others, covering the same taxable years, had already been decided against the
taxpayer under the old law. But the Senate suggestion would have cleared
the air of Tower and Culbertson for the future, and would have been the
wiser choice.
The time-reference of the new law raises another problem: will long-stand-
ing family partnerships originally created by gift, valid under the old rules,
be required to submit to income reallocation for taxable years beginning in
1951 ? This problem will not be widespread because the distribution of income
under a partnership agreement was one of the criteria previously used to de-
termine the validity of family partnerships. 72 No partnership which distri-
buted income inequitably would have been upheld under the old law. But for
older partnerships the fixed income of the donor, though reasonable when
LAW oF FEDERAL INCOM TAXATioN §§ 35.02 et scq. (1949) for an indication of the tine
lag between the taxable year in dispute and the year when the issue is decided in the
courts. Crowded calendars in the Tax Court and appellate courts will add to the delay.
69. See note 36 supra.
70. It is possible, however, that future decisions might have allowed reallocation
even without § 191. The Hartz, Canfield and Woolsey cases denied reallocation on their
particular facts without expressing blanket disapproval. See note 36 supra. Henceforth,
in partnership disputes involving taxable years before the new law applies, courts may
begin independently to reallocate income without regard to § 191.
71. SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 40-1 (1951): "Such an election [by a
member of the partnership] will be valid only if any other members of the partnership
whose taxable income would be increased consent to the assessment and collection of
such deficiency, or if the taxpayer who would be entitled to a refund or reduction of his
tax liability consents to the reduction of such refund or tax decrease by the amount of
the related taxpayer's additional tax."
72. See Woolsey v. Commissioner, Canfield v. Commissioner and Hartz v. Com-
missioner, cited at note 36, supra.
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the agreement was made, may not be reasonable at current values.7a One
solution is to exempt from income reallocation partnerships where reasonable
compensation was originally made for the services of the donor. But since
such partnerships would thereby be able to distribute part of the income from
services to holders of capital interests, the Commissioner will not accept this
answer without a struggle. More likely, old partnerships will be subject to
the reallocation provisions for income earned after 1950. If this is allowed,
the Commissioner may well attack any partnership in any year when he can
prove that the donor's salary, once reasonable, is now too low. Lest an escalator
wage scale be introduced to further complicate the family partnership problem,
a judicial stand to stop harrassment by the Commissioner may be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Section 191 is an example of shabby legislative draftsmanship. Enacted
to cope with a complex problem, it offers illusory solutions, poses new prob-
lems of its own, and fails to close all the family partnership loopholes. Con-
gress' restrictions on the distribution of income once a partnership is recog-
nized reflect either an ignorance or disregard of the economic theory which
credits part of profits to the going concern. Congress again failed to accept
the partnership, for profit-calculating purposes, as an economic entity as real
as a corporation. And as long as the economic fact that the partnership is an
entity is disregarded, confusion and contradition are likely legislative results.Y4
Particularly in the area of family partnerships, where the donee often con-
tributes nothing of his own to the enterprise, present law fails to tax income
to the one who earns it. Distributing to the donee part of the business profits
earned largely by the services of the donor is contradictory to the declared
intent of Congress. The 1951 statute, guaranteeing partnership recognition if
there is a valid gift, provides a new opportunity for taxpayer-partners to set
up trusts for their children, make the trust a partner and enjoy reduced taxes
as a result. Finally, the time reference of the new amendment keeps the
Culbertson test alive for any partnership litigation involving taxable years
prior to 1951.
Apart from faulty draftmanship, most of the problems under 191 are symp-
toms rather than results. They spring from the dichotomy between the eco-
nomic fact of the family as an income-producing unit and the legislative policy
which aims at taxing each individual member.75 Careful judicial treatment of
73. FPhed salaries, once considered reasonable, might be attacked as "unreasonable"
when wage levels rise with the increasing cost of living.
74. See Brookes, The Strange Nature of the Partnership Under the Income Tax
Law, 5 TAx L. REv. 35, 56 (1949), and Lrma, FEDAL INcO mE TA XTo, OF PA M.iER-
SHiPS, 1-18 (1952).
75. Ryan, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family, 32 AfAmg. L. Rnv. 244 (1949). See
also the statement of the Treasury Department on "The Tax Treatment of Family In-
come" reported in Hearings Before House Committee on WITays and Means on Reventue
Revisions, 1947, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 846-74 (1947).
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the new partnership amendment may help effect its purpose. But 191 will
afford little additional support for the "tax the husband" position of Lucas
v. Earl. The Lucas philosophy, fully developed in the Clifford-Horst line of
cases in opposition to intra-family transfers,7" was partially overruled by the
husband-wife split income provisions of 1948. Since in practice it will be hard
to administer and enforce the reasonable compensation requirements, Section
191 may actually corrode the Lucas philosophy further. Ultimately, a solution
to the problems of intra-family transfers may come only when the family,
rather than the individual, is recognized as the basic unit for income taxation.
76. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591, 605 et seq. (1948).
